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Introduction
You have asked me to speak about “Morality, Law, and Judicial Ethics 
in the Western Legal Tradition”. I am particularly glad to do so in Istanbul, 
which is the first and most important home of the Western legal tradition. 
I am honored to be in your beautiful city, which reminds us on every side 
what human beings can accomplish, when they work to build the rule of 
law, so that all can live together in justice and peace.
The focus of our symposium will be on judicial ethics, but I have been 
given a somewhat broader charge, relating morality, law, and legal ethics 
generally to the Western legal tradition as a whole. This topic is dear to my 
heart, important, fascinating, and very useful, but it requires some caution 
at the beginning, because our ultimate subject is universal, not parochial. 
The essence of legal and judicial ethics arises from human nature, which 
is the same everywhere, and therefore all societies participate or should 
participate equally in the search for justice and the rule of law. The Western 
legal tradition provokes our interest because its history is so well-known 
and well-recorded, but every legal tradition and all nations participate in 
this same vital struggle towards peace and justice through the rule of law.
The Origins of the Western Legal Tradition
The Western legal tradition is of particular interest in Istanbul, 
because it was here that the Emperor Justinian - Flavius Petrus Sabbatius 
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Iustinianus Augustus - inaugurated the compilation of the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis, including the Code, the Digest, and the Institutes, that became 
the basis of modern law in the West and guided legal developments 
everywhere through its vast (and often tacit) influence on enlightened 
judges and scholars, for a millennium and a half, until this very day. The 
vast erudition, rationality, and painstaking detail of the Corpus Iuris made 
it the constant (if often secret) recourse of every learned (or less learned) 
judge - for good and ill - for centuries. I say “for good or ill” because in 
addition to containing some excellent and very well-worked-out principles 
of law, the Corpus Iuris also contains some very poor ones, reflecting the 
self-interest and corruption of the emperors themselves.
I blame the emperors in this way for introducing some of their own 
worst attributes into the Western legal tradition, because the roots of 
the tradition go back further still, before there were emperors, to the 
legal ideas of the Roman republic, and the first guiding principle of that 
commonwealth - at least according to the Roman Titus Livius, who wrote 
the Romans’ own history of Rome. This was the principle that the “imperia 
legum” (“rule of the laws”) is or ought to be “potentiora quam hominum” 
(“more powerful than the rule of men.”) This principle, Livy said, made 
Rome great, and led to the Romans’ long-lasting felicity and success. When 
the rule-of-law principle declined, Livy observed, so did the beauty and 
influence of Rome herself.
The Ideals of the Western Legal Tradition
Rome claimed to be a “republic” (“res publica”), which is to say a 
polity ruled by law for the well-being of the people - all the people - and 
not according to the arbitrary will of an emperor, a few rulers, or those who 
have gotten control of the government, whoever they may be. This was the 
ideal, of course, and not always the reality, but it is a beautiful ideal. Nor 
is it only a Western ideal. The rule of law is a universal ideal, which every 
government and every legal system claims to serve, whether it really does 
so or not. The idea that the the laws should rule and not the mere will or 
power of men is present in every legal system and every legal tradition - 
however hypocritically - because this principle is the essence of what 
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justifies or would justify any legal system, if that legal system were justified 
at all. 
Legal systems are only justified when they actually maintain the rule 
of law. This signifies finding and maintaining those laws that really serve 
the well-being of the community as a whole and not just the interests of the 
rulers or some powerful faction. Rulers should not have arbitrary power, 
but should on act in the public capacity to serve and protect the rule of law, 
for the common good and the benefit of society as a whole. This principle is 
at the heart of the Western legal tradition, but I believe it is also shared in 
one form or another by every legal system in the world, at least in theory, 
because without adhering to this principle, or at least asserting a claim to 
adhere to this principle, that legal system would be a nullity - illegitimate - 
not worthy of our obedience, our consideration, or the slightest respect.
The Foundations of the Rule of Law
The rule of law principle has been particularly deeply examined 
and elaborated in what we now call the West, because of the influence 
of Justinian, the Corpus Iuris Civilis and the heritage of Roman law. But 
even this valuable and interesting tradition is not without its faults. The 
Roman legal tradition as we received it from Justinian did not always 
support its sensible and timeless principles with equally sensible and 
timeless institutions. Roman students of the law knew and often lamented 
that the rule of law has two central and unavoidable desiderata: first, good 
principles of law and justice, but second, good institutions, to make the 
principles of justice real. It is not enough to declare fidelity to justice and 
the rule of law and not of men, there must also be procedures in place to 
prevent corruption, usurpations, and departures from the law by those who 
are charged to uphold it.
The need for good institutions to discover, enforce, and protect 
the principles of law is equally and perhaps more important than the 
principles themselves Fortunately, the basic structural requirements of just 
government are well-known, including term-limits on executive power, 
elections to the legislature, the separation of powers and above all the 
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independence of judges, empowering them to protect law, justice, and the 
constitution against the usurpations of executive power. We should strive 
to implement these everywhere.
The Necessity of Judicial Independence
This brings us back at last to judicial ethics - the overall theme of this 
symposium - because the central virtue of a judge is fidelity to the rule of 
law, including justice and the common good, which are the proper basis 
of all law and legal authority. Judges should be faithful to the rule of law 
(and justice and the common good) and not to anything or anyone else. 
To fulfill their duties properly judges must be independent: independent 
of the government, independent of the legislature, independent of religion, 
even independent of the people. Their only fidelity when they act as judges 
should be to the rule of law, and not to anyone else.
I mentioned that the Roman emperors to whom we owe the 
preservation, strength and great detail of the Western legal tradition 
also introduced several great faults. Chief among these was the principle 
embraced by Justinian and his successors that they themselves were above 
or outside the law, that “princeps legibus solutus est” (Digest 1.3.31) - “the 
emperor is untrammeled by the law.” Or even worse, it was asserted “quod 
principi placuit, legis habet vigorem” (Digest 1.4.1) - “that which pleases the 
prince has the force of law”. Both of these principles are antithetical to the 
rule of law and have led to corruption, to injustice, to poverty and disaster 
wherever they have been practiced or intruded into concepts of the law.
The Subordination of Executive Power
A brief review of the origins of the Western legal tradition reminds 
us that the whole history of law and legal ethics in the West has been the 
battle to establish and maintain the first principle of justice - the “imperium 
legum” or “rule of law” - against the rival pretensions of emperors, kings, 
and other executive authorities that they themselves and those in control 
of the coercive powers of the state are ultimately in some way above 
or outside the law. The key to a just society is that those in positions of 
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authority themselves be bound by and subordinate to the rule of law. As 
Henry of Bracton said in England in the thirteenth century, the king himself 
must be “sub Deo et lege” - “beneath God and the law.”
The great fame of England as the home of liberty in the eighteenth 
century arose from the Act of Settlement in 1701. This was the Act through 
which the king and Parliament promised that judges should serve 
“quamdiu se bene gesserint” (“so long as they were not corrupted”) rather 
than at the will of the executive (“durante bene placito”). Federal judges 
under the United States Constitution enjoy the same protection (Art. III.1). 
The purpose of this protection is to assure that judges will have the security 
and independence to maintain the rule of law against the will and desires of 
the president, the government, the legislature, and even against the people, 
when the people or legislature or president desire something that violates 
the rule of law. Judges without this security remain subject to coercion by 
the very powers whom they should control.
The Virtues of Judges
The history of the Western legal tradition identifies two primary 
virtues that judges must have to protect the integrity and justice of the legal 
system which they exist to serve: judges should be independent and judges 
should be faithful to the rule of law. The heart of legal ethics rests on the 
judges’ fidelity to these two principles. The two judicial virtues are related, 
but they are not the same. The rule of law is the principle that no man nor 
government should ever enjoy arbitrary power. The principle of judicial 
independence protects judges against the arbitrary power of others.
The rule of law prohibition on arbitrary power raises important 
semantic points about the nature of law, the purpose of law, and the role of 
judicial power in relation to the state. The rule of law must be distinguished 
from rule by law. The rule of law exists when citizens are liberated from 
arbitrary power. Rule by law exists when powerful individuals use the 
forms of law to exercise their own arbitrary power. Judges have the 
duty to maintain the rule of law against the incursions of rule by law. 
Constitutionalism is the vehicle through which modern States strengthen 
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judges for this task of legal protection, but it is a duty they would have 
whatever the nominal structure of the State. Judges are by nature the 
ministers of justice and must protect law’s integrity against those who 
would suborn the forms of law to serve their own private ends.
Judges in Unjust Legal Systems
The purpose of law is justice and all legal systems claim to be just. 
They claim to be just and they claim to deserve obedience because they are 
just. But although all legal systems claim to serve justice, sometimes they 
do not. This raises a dilemma for judges, whose duty it is to serve justice 
and the rule of law. When legal systems become corrupted or are seized or 
suborned by a ruler or a faction or a party, using the forms of law to serve 
their own ends, then it is not the rule of law that prevails, but the rule of 
men. At some point it becomes the duty of the judge to interpret or enforce 
the law in such a way that it serves its actual purpose, which is justice, 
rather than serving those who have diverted the legal system to their own 
private use.
Judges have a duty of justice that transcends the particular legal 
system in which they find themselves. Every legal system claims to serve 
justice, which is to say the common welfare of society as a whole. When 
this is true, then the duty of the judge is an easy one: simply to resist the 
influence of presidents, prime ministers, parliaments, or anyone else who 
would try to subvert the legal system and influence judges to disregard the 
law. But judges also have a duty to recognize when the legal system itself 
becomes unjust, and prevent this from happening. This is the heavier and 
more difficult role. At some point judges must resist growing injustice by 
interpreting unjust enactments - even against their plain meaning - in such 
a way as to make them more just.
Judicial Ethics: 
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The Bravery of Judges
The hardest duty of judges demands that they exhibit bravery in the 
face of state-sponsored injustice. Suppose that the government creates 
legislation to oppress minorities. Suppose that the legislature operates 
purely to enrich one class within society. Suppose that the president acts 
in his own interest and not the interest of the nation. Judges must have the 
courage to oppose these injustices, even at the risk of facing oppression and 
injustice themselves.
Here we encounter one of the most important aspects of the Western 
legal tradition, not just the realization that government and law exist for 
the good of everyone, but also the willingness to resist those with authority 
when they begin to abuse public powers for their own private interests. 
This is a duty that attaches to all citizens, but particularly judges, whose 
duty it is to uphold justice and the rule of law. The Western legal systems 
inspired most and flourished best when judges found the strength to defy 
bad governments, who violated the rights of the people.
Legal Ethics
We lawyers talk a lot about legal ethics in the United States, just as 
we frequently discuss judicial ethics, but nevertheless often fall prey to a 
professional deformation that leads us to confuse ethics with legislation, 
and forget the role of morality in the ethical life of the lawyer. By morality 
I mean the totality of what we ought to do, as opposed the the narrower 
province of law, which encompasses only those things which we must or 
are required to do. So, for example, in Maryland, where I live, we have 
drafted a code of legal ethics, which most lawyers read very carefully and 
try to follow the rules that it sets out. But this is not enough.
Lawyers and judges who treat their codes of ethics as enactments, 
or strict rules to be followed to avoid punishment, miss the point of 
the enterprise. Judicial and legal ethics should go beyond mere rules or 
enactments delineating what judges and lawyers must do, to the broader 
and more important question of what they ought to do to fulfill their 
professional roles correctly. These further requirements cannot and should 
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not be externally enforced. Judges ought to have an understanding of and 
loyalty to their underlying principles of independence, justice, and fidelity 
to the rule of law. They ought to have the fortitude to frustrate the desires 
of those with power in society, including the government of the day.
Freedom
England was famous in the eighteenth century for being the freest place 
on earth. The great philosopher and apostle of enlightenment, Voltaire, 
visited England, saw this, and tried to understand why. The reason he 
found was that the English had then better and more firmly than anywhere 
else on earth prescribed limits to the power of their kings. They did so by 
empowering judges, by making judges independent and safe from attack. 
Judges in England were independent beyond judges in any other nation 
of the world because they did not wait to receive independence from the 
hands of power. They took it - and punished those who slighted their 
authority.
The great English jurist Sir Edward Coke made clear that law was 
above the king. And when King Charles I violated the English Constitution 
and the rights of the English people, the English put King Charles on 
trial, found him guilty, and severed his head from his body. Then again, 
when Charles’ son James II once more attempted to rule outside the law, 
the English removed James from office, and he fled to France. His fate, 
and the fate of his father, offer useful lessons for judges and governments 
everywhere. There is no liberty without the law and no law where judges 
cannot punish and restrain the executive, when he violates the limits of his 
power.
Conclusion
Reflection on the Western legal tradition yields a few obvious 
conclusions about law, judges, and judicial ethics. The heart of the Western 
legal tradition has been the struggle to create a world in which the law rules 
and not men. This will never be possible unless judges are independent, 
safe from attack, and devoted to the rule of law. This devotion remains the 
Judicial Ethics: 
The Past and Today
543
central duty of all judges everywhere. Judges must have the courage and 
fortitude to apply the laws impartially, despite the interests and influence 
of other powerful actors in society. The legal system should be structured 
to make this easy, but judges must assert their independence even when 
established institutions deny them the protections they deserve.
Judges matter most when governments behave the worst. When 
presidents and parliaments use the forms of law to act corruptly, or to 
oppress individuals or groups in society, then judges must resist them 
too. They must use their powers of interpretation to make the legal system 
more just, when it falls away from justice. Judges are or can or should be 
the heroes of the rule of law. I am honored to have the opportunity to speak 
with so many brave judges here today!
